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REGENT CASE COMMENTS
that the sounder principles lay in those authorities which hold
that the transaction is not usurious. After all, the borrower is
obliged merely to furnish additional security; it is scarcely likely
that local usury laws have been intended to forbid such a relative-
ly harmless practice.' It is true that a requirement to take out
insurance with the lender may be a clever scheme for selling in-
surance, still that consideration should bear no weight as an argu-
ment based on usury. Perhaps there is another factor in this
line of cases, namely, a judicial belief that fair collateral advan-
tages should be upheld. Clearly, one now discerns a growing
tendency to approve and enforce collateral stipulations" that were
once held to be "clogs on the equity of redemption" in mortgages."'
Though the insurance policy may properly be held to typify a
contract of adhesion,' and, therefore, one to be construed most
narrowly against the insurance company lender, there is no such
strong social interest in usury as to invalidate the present secur-
ity transaction.
-R. E. HAGBERG.
VERDICT - JUROR'S ASSENT - WHAT CONSTITUTES. - In the
trial of a recent criminal case, juror no. 12 told the court that
he feared -for his health and life if he had to continue in jury
service. Medical examination disclosed that he was suffering only
physical discomfort which would not affect his capacity as a juror.
He continued in jury service, and a verdict of guilty was ren-
dered. On the poll, all of the jurors agreed to the verdict. In
answer to further questions asked him by the court concerning
his physical condition, juror no. 12 said that he agreed in order
to escape further confinement and suffering, although he did not
believe that the defendants were guilty. The verdict was then
recorded over the defendants' objection, and a new trial was re-
the law to be reasoned from analogy the same as any other rule of
law .... )"1 0 The excess profit to the lender is hardly an evil of such magnitude as to
outweigh advantages of free capital investment in West Virginia.
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Nichols, supra n. 3 (The theory of
the court is that the business of the company is to insure lives. Since its
surplus funds must be invested it is not unreasonable to confine its loans
to policy-holders; in other words, the company may validly insist upon fair
reciprocity).
17 See Williams, Clogging the Equity of Bedemption (1933) 40 W. VA. L.
Q. 31, 50."0 See Vance, supra n. 6, pp. 201, 215.
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fused. Held: It was a reversible error to record the verdict.
There was no unanimous verdict, since the necessary assent of the
mind was not given by juror no. 12. United States v. Pleva.'
A juror may change his verdict,' or a poll of the jury may be
taken,' at any time before the verdict is recorded or the jury dis-
charged. For these reasons, the statements of improper motives
made by a juror who is being polled, before either of these events
take place, must be taken into consideration by the court in deter-
mining whether there exists the unanimous assent' of the mind
necessary to a valid verdict. The validity of the verdict is a
question of fact for the trial court to determine in its sound dis-
cretion.' Thus the court may in a proper case refuse to inquire
into the motives of a juror," since the only purpose of the poll is
to determine what is the verdict.' But such an inquiry is proper
when the motive of the juror may determine the validity of his
verdict.
There is a fairly well defined limit within which the juror's
answer or statements when he is polled are held to be sufficient
agreement to make the verdict unanimous. There is no doubt that
an assent given by a juror contrary to his conscience is insufficient
On the other hand, it is not necessary that his mind be clearly
free from doubt.' The obvious reason for this latter rule is that
166 P. (2d) 529 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933).
2Lawrence v. Stearns, 11 Pick. 501 (Mass. 1831); Weeks v. Hart, 24
Hun. 181 (N. Y. 1881); Owens v. Southern R. Co., 123 N. C. 183, 31 S. E.
383 (1898); Scott v. Scott, 110 Pa. 387, 2 Atl. 531 (1885); B. & 0. R. R.
Co. v. P. W. Go., 14 Gratt. 447 (Va. 1858); Yonker v. Grimm, 101 W. Va.
711, 113 S. E. 695 (1926).
OState v. Waymire, 52 Ore. 281, 97 Pac. 46 (1908).
'Lawrence v. Stearns, supra n. 2; Weeks v. Hart, supra n. 2; Brogan v.
Union Traction Co., 76 W. Va. 698, 86 S. E. 753 (1915) (Unanimity in
result alone is sufficient); see Note (1899) 43 L. R. A. 33.
People v. Faber, 199 N. Y. 256, 92 N. B. 674, 20 Ann. Cas. 879 (1910);
Rothbauer v. State, 22 Wis. 468 (1868).
OIN re Buchanan, 158 U. S. 31, 15 S. Ct. 723 (1895); Martin v. State,
124 So. 392 (Ala. 1929); Hill v. State, 64 Ga. 453 (1880); Bunn v. Hoyt,
3 Johns. 255 (N. Y. 1808) (It is proper to send the jury back to deliberate
further, in case of an insufficient verdict).
Ioss v. State, 152 Ala. 30, 44 So. 598 (1907) (In polling the jury, the
court has a sound discretion in deciding whether it will inquire into the
motives of a juror); State v. Tomlinson, 7 N. D. 294, 74 N. W. 995 (1898).
'State v. Boger, 202 N. C. 702, 163 S. E. 877 (1932).
OBnn v. Hoyt, supra n. 6 [a civil case, cited with approval in Douglass
v. Tousey, 2 Wend. 352 (N. Y. 1829)]; State v. Austin, 6 Wis. 205 (1858)
(A juror indicated grave doubt, but answered in the affirmative after the
court insisted that he answer "yes" or "no". The verdict was declared
insufficient); Farrell v. Hennesy, 21 Wis. 639 (1867) (a civil case, in which
the error was waived by failure to object before the verdict was recorded).
"Parker v. State, 81 Ga. 332, 6 S. E. 600 (1888) ; Ponder v. State, 11 Ga.
App. 60, 74 S. E. 715 (1912); State v. Asher, 63 Mont. 302, 206 Pac. 1091
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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
a requirement of wholehearted agreement would render it ex-
tremely difficult to obtain a verdict in most cases. Between these
two extremes there is the middle ground, in which the juror's
statements disclose varying degrees of doubt or agreement. A
mere indication by a juror that his verdict is influenced by the
opinion of other jurors,' or by a desire to avoid a "hung" jury,"
will not alone invalidate his verdict, if the juror maintains that
it is his verdict. But if there is added to either of these reasons
the statement of the juror that he does not regard the verdict as
correct,' the essential assent of the mind is lacking. Into this
class of eases the principal case falls, and the juror's fear for his
own health overcomes his desire to acquit the defendants. But
an affirmative answer to the poll question is not overcome by such
indefinite statements as "I reckon so"," and "I suppose so",'
made immediately before the affirmative answer. The court must
not use coercion in obtaining such an affirmative answer." In
civil cases, the assent to the verdict need not be so strong as in
criminal cases.'
In the principal case, the fact that the juror was mistaken as
to the danger he was in does not remove his incapacity as a juror,
for the coercion still existed. Since they see only the printed
record, the appellate courts properly show a reluctance to upset
trial court rulings on whether the juror's affirmative answer repre-
sents his true convictions. In such a clear instance as the princi-
pal case, however, there is little or no doubt that a reversal is
proper.
-PUL D. FARR.
(1922) (Juror answered that it was his verdict, on condition that sentence
be suspended, and then when the question was repeated, answered "yes".
There was sufficient agreement); of., State v. Austin, supra n. 9.
nHenderson v. State, 12 Tex. 525, 533 (1854).
"State v. Millroy, 103 Wash. 193, 174 Pac. 10 (1918).
2BRothbauer v. State, supra n. 5.
2 Martin v. State, supra n. 6.
i v. State, supra n. 6.
"State v. Austin, supra n. 9 (the insistence by the court that the juror
answer "1yes" or "no" amounted to coercion).
'7Macon Ry. & Light Co. v. Barnes, 121 Ga. 443, 49 S. E. 282 (1904)
(the court purposely avoided an authoritative decision, but said that in the
light of former decisions, an unwilling compromise on the amount of re-
covery, would not invalidate the verdict); Black v. Thornton, 31 Ga. 641
(1860) (the juror's answer that he found for the defendant, but was not
satisfied with the verdict was held to be sufficient assent). These civil cases
cite criminal cases for general propositions, and vice versa, but the results
of the cases cited supra nn. 916 inclusive, when compared, show that the
courts require more perfect assent in criminal cases.
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